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The United States Navy's forces afloat do not have a
single source document that addresses anti-terrorism and
counterterror ism. The increase in terrorism world-wide has
stimulated the concern that vulnerable maritime vessels will
become terrorist targets. U. S. Navy ships in a restricted
maneuvering situation, at anchor in a harbor, or moored
pierside may offer an attractive target to a terrorist
group. To deal with this potential terrorist threat, per-
sonnel manning U. S. Navy ships must be educated in the
fundamentals of terrorism; the ships' security program must
be evaluated and modified accordingly; various watches,
sentries, and teams must be trained in new anti- and counter-
terrorist procedures; and contingency plans must be devel-
oped to deal with potential terrorist incidents. This study-
provides a guide for the development of effective anti-
terrorist and counterterror i st programs for any ship type in
the U. S. Navy.
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I- INJBQDycjigN
The term terrorism is commonly used in today's vocabu-
lary. However, an understanding o-f the term, its implica-
tions, and its complexities eludes most people. It seems
that the American people are becoming more and more insensi-
tive to terrorism -from having been exposed to reports on
terrorist activities on an almost daily basis. Also, be-
cause terrorist incidents seldom occur in the United States
and, thus, -few Americans are directly affected by such
activities, there is little genuine concern or interest in
terrorism in this country. Therefore, even though terrorism
is a commonly used term in the United States, not very many
people really understand all that it represents.
The early literature on terrorism appears to be limited
to mere accounts of various terrorist incidents. The later
literature, however, attempts to understand the particulars
surrounding such acts. Countless articles and books on the
psychological, philosophical, and sociological aspects of
terrorism have been published, resulting in ongoing debates
on the subject. Even so, it has only been recently that the
students of terrorism have begun to utilize this wealth of
information in an effort to formulate an active strategy
aimed at deterring terrorist attacks.
Governments and industries have launched programs to
facilitate and improve anti-terrorist and counterterrori st
techniques. In a similar manner, the United States Navy's
forces afloat must also seek measures to deter terrorism.
Countless and varied accounts of violent terrorist acts have
shown that nothing and no one is immune.
The increase in terrorism world-wide has stimulated the
concern that maritime vessels may become the targets of
terrorist attacks. The marine environment, by its natural
design, exposes ships to many vulnerable situations that are
very conducive to terrorist attacks. Some examples of these
situations 3irei when a ship is in a restricted maneuvering
situation such as entering a harbor, transiting straits,
narrow channels, or canals; when a ship is at anchor; or
when a ship is moored pierside or i n a nest. The sinking of
a ship resulting in the blocking of a harbor entrance would
have high political value for the terrorist. The vulnera-
bility of many ships in such situations can be diminished or
avoided by an alert, knowledgeable, and offensive (as op-
posed to reactionary) security force. An overt protective
program may, in and of itself, act as a deterrent against
the occurrence of a terrorist act.
Simply stated, the problem is that there currently is no
consolidated guide regarding anti-terrorism and counterter-
rorist planning for the United States Navy's forces afloat.
The entire chain of command, from theater commanders to
battle group commanders, promulgate statements and policies
in a variety of operation orders that address terrorism.
Likewise, the Department of Defense and all the services
have issued various instructions for the protection of per
—
sonnel abroad and the security of installations. But there
is no single tool available that addresses education,
training, security, intelligence, or reporting procedures
for terrorists incidents. Therefore, a guide incorporating
the necessary information on terrorism with suggestions as
to how to deter and combat it must be developed for the
safety of personnel and the protection of property aboard
all U. S. Navy ships.
The intent of this guide is twofold. First, the funda-
mentals of terrorism must be formulated and presented to
U. S. Naval personnel through a systematic education program,
Secondly, once the fundamentals of terrorism are fully un-
derstood, security programs on U. S. Navy vessels must be
analyzed and improved accordingly to harden them against
terrorist action. Both elements of such an anti-terrorist
effort must be universally implemented by U. S. naval forces
afloat in such a way that the the development of counterter-
rorist techniques tailored to each ship type will naturally
f ol low.
The current physical security program for U. S. naval
forces afloat will provide the principal guidelines on how
to combat threats to a ship. What will enhance this program
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is the training and mental conditioning required to recog-
nize and deal with terrorism as a new menace employing
unconventional techniques. Efforts must be made to maintain
a high degree of alertness which will strengthen the physi-
cal security program and deter terrorist attacks.
In keeping with these concepts, this study will first
take advantage of the available knowledge on terrorism and
present the fundamental structure of revolutionary move-
ments, which represents the core of an educational program
for personnel assigned to forces afloat. Then, some sugges-
ted areas for improvement of shipboard physical security
will be addressed to stimulate a command's analysis of its
own internal security. Hopefully, the discussion will en-
courage the analysis of port security plans for ships and
the contingency plan apparatus both on board and in the
chain of command. The discussion should also stimulate an
investigation into the agreements or treaties with host
countries in the fleet of operations and a close examination
of the limitations provided by the chain of command in the
Rules of Engagement (ROE).
As an example, a cursory glance at the following routine
shipboard evolution may provide one instance that exposes
some inherent weaknesses in the current security mindset:
United States Navy ships have been pulling into a
certain Italian port for years and any casual observer may
easily notice the routine times of the changing of the
watch, not just the quarterdeck watch, but all the watches
(the armed rover, some interior watches that report to the
Q-f-ficer o-F the Deck, and the topside security). At 0345
(the standard time to turn over the watch) on a misty
morning, tired men Ar& going o-f-f watch, not -fully alert
men ^re coming on watch, and most of these personnel ^re
gathered on the quarterdeck conducting a turnover. This
may be a very pregnable opportunity in the eyes of a
casual observer, despite the security program.
Again, the objective of this guide is not to entertain
the idea that the Navy's ships have inadequate security
plans, but rather to improve the existing program by stimu-
lating and encouraging individual commands to exercise their
prerogative and flexibility. Efforts to tap the ingenuity
o-f the crew and to focus enthusiasm on personnel awareness
and target hardening will deter terrorist acts against U. S.
naval units and ships' companies and will lend more credi-
bility to ant i -terrorist measures.
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II. FUNDAMENTALS OF TERRORISM
Finding the solution to a problem is much easier when
the problem is approached with a prior knowledge o-f its
particular structure. Likewise, the military planner should
have a thorough understanding of the threat he is facing
before deciding what tactics should be used to combat it.
This same approach is also very useful in the formulation of
a solution to the problem of protecting ships against
potential terrorist incidents. As suggested in the Intro-
duction to this paper, a systematic program must be estab-
lished to acquaint ships' personnel with the basics of
terrorism so that they may become more familiar with the
threat.
A wide spectrum of professionals from the academic and
medical worlds have explored and investigated terrorism in
great detail. However, only recently has a concerted effort
been made by governments and industries to apply this infor-
mation in a practical way for the purpose of combating
terror i sm.
A fundamental terrorist strategy is the exploitation of
the element of surprise. The terrorist decides when and
where an attack will occur. The use of surprise, together
with imagination and concentrated effort, have thus far made
it possible for most terrorists to evade the efforts made to
11
neutralise or eliminate them. The unpredictability and
ingenuity employed by terrorists has made it imperative
•for commands that are developing effective anti- and counter-
terrorist measures to view terrorism through the eyes of the
terrori st
.
The foundation for the discussion of the fundamentals of
terrorism will be laid by using the old familiar strategy of
pursuing the what, who, how, why, where, and when of the
i ssue.
A. THE DEFINITION (WHAT)
The first step in analyzing the problem is to attempt to
define contemporary terrorism: what is it? There is no
widely accepted or precise definition and, as has been
alluded to earlier, there is a divergence of opinion and
continual debate concerning exactly what terrorism entails.
The following probe for a suitable concept of terrorism will
demonstrate some of this controversy.
The establishment of a useful definition of terrorism is
greatly helped by using a chronological approach. A 1939
study CRef. 1: pp. 383-3963 found that the word "terrorism"
is derived from the Latin "terror" which originally meant
physical trembling. Later "terror" came to include the
emotional state of fear. Thus "terrorism" literally means
"system of terror." That same study concluded that "ter-
rorism is a method of action by which an agent tends to
1"?
produce terror in order to impose his domination." CRef. 2:
p. 3833
The 1948 edition o-f the Encyclopedia of the Sgci.al.
Sciences de-fines terrorism "as a term used to describe the
method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized
group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chie-fly
through the systematic use o-f violence." CRef. 3: p. 3833
The 1960 's produced some variations on the last theme,
describing terrorism as "the threat or the use o-f violence
for political ends," CRe-f. 4: p. 3843 "a symbolic act de-
signed to influence political behavior by extranormal means,
entailing the use or threat o-f violence," CRe-f. 5: p. 3843
and describing a siege o-f terror as "the attempt to destroy
an authority system by creating extreme fear through sys-
tematic violence." CRe-f. 6: p. 3843
The orderly analysis of these and many other definitions
brings to light certain consistent properties of terrorism:
"(1) Terrorism is part of a revolutionary Cpolitical3
strategy—a method used by insurgents to seize po-
litical power from an existing government.
"(2) Terrorism is manifested in acts of socially and
politically unacceptable violence.
"(3) There is a consistent pattern of symbolic or
representative selection of the victims or objects
of the act of terrorism.
"(4) The revolutionary movement deliberately intends
those actions to create a psychological effect on
specific groups and thereby to change their
political behavior and attitudes." CRef. 1: p. 3853
In summary, the common denominator of terrorism is vio-
lence for which there Are some identifiable characteristics:
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"(1) Use o-f illegal violence in a systematic campaign.
"(2) Symbolic representation in target selection.
"(3) Acts conducted for maximum publicity value.
"(4) Nonrecogni tion of neutrals or noncombatants.
"(5) Often directed at civilians.
"(6) Waged outside normal rules of conflict.
"(7) Usually waged by non-government groups.
"(8) Fear used as a persuasive weapon.
"(9) Committed for political goals." CRef. 7: pp. 3-43
In the context of a U. S. Naval ship being a terrorist
target, most of the above characteristics Are cause for
concern.
The U. S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as
"
. . . the unlawful use or threatened use of force or
violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals
or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating
governments or societies, often for ideological purposes."
CRef. 8: p. 12:
1 • I§£X2!li§n]! B tJsw. PiQ^Osign of Warfare?
The search for a niche for terrorism within the
spectrum of conflict is the subject of wide debate today.
The character that contemporary international terrorism has
developed in recent years suggests that it may belong at the
low end of the spectrum of non-nuclear armed conflict. For
the purposes of this discussion, non-nuclear armed conflict
consists o-f- conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and
terrorism. x
'•Concepts were borrowed from Brian Michael Jenkins' "New
Modes of Conflict" (Rand Corporation, June 1983). See this
study for detailed development of the concept of terrorism
as a mode of conflict.
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The present discord in Lebanon serves as a good
example of the coexistence o-f the three elements of armed
conflict. Guerrillas and terrorists as well as participants
from regular armies and private militias are engaged in
Lebanon's civil war. The terrorists may be sponsored by
states, political organizations, religious factions, or
other terrorist groups. Conventional warfare, guerrilla
warfare, and terrorism are interrelated and can be employed
in varying degrees with varying combinations. The options
include employing all three elements concurrently, separate-
ly, or interchangeably.
Of the three elements of armed conflict, terrorism
has become more prevalent in the eighties due, primarily, to
the fact that terrorists are militarily weak and, secondari-
ly, to the prohibitive cost of conventional war-fare. Many
countries lacking military strength may also engage in some
form of terrorism because they are unwilling, as well as
unable, to challenge a militarily superior nation, such as
the United States, in open armed conflict. In addition to
the mere expense of modern weaponry, the sophistication of
todays weapons requires costly personnel training and the
impact of public opinion on armaments also contributes to
the high cost in many instances. Because of its relative
inexpensi veness, many nation-states resort to terrorism as a
cheap means of waging war. Thus, modern terrorism, as an
15
instrument of conflict, has emerged as an effective alterna-
tive to conventional warfare.
While Lebanon serves as an example of the use of
terrorism as well as conventional and guerrilla warfare in
an armed conflict within a country, it is important to note
that terrorism also spills over the boundaries of nations.
It is not confined to national frontiers. 2 According to
Brian Jenkins "terrorist activity cannot be isolated from
other modes of armed conflict among nations or within other
nations, but can be seen as another dimension of warfare."
CRef. 10: p. 511 In counterpoint, even though terrorism may-
be considered another dimension of warfare, it has been
effectively handled by police and criminal justice systems
in many countries, West Germany, for example.
In view of the above conclusion that terrorism is
"another dimension of warfare," it becomes necessary for
U. S. forces afloat to devise a new set of military require-
ments. A naval ship represents an investment made by the
United States designed for military action at one end of the
conflict spectrum, conventional warfare. The investment
manifests itself in expensive, sophisticated technology and
'Taking into account the character of the war in
Lebanon, in which state-sponsored terrorism coexists with
conventional and guerrilla warfare, the Long Commission
(which investigated the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks
in Beirut) concluded that the Department of Defense's
definition of terrorism was inadequate and "should be
expanded to include states." CRef. 9: p. 1233
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highly trained personnel geared to missions of varying dimen-
sions o-f modern war-fare, such as anti-air (AAW) or anti-
submarine war-fare (ASW) . The challenge to the. commanding
officer of a U. S. ship is to mold these assets, both
personnel and equipment, to conform with, and thus be more
effective against, the potential threat at the other end of
the conflict spectrum, modern contemporary terrorism.
Whether deployed in a third world conflict or making
a port call in a Western European country, the commanding
officer and crew of a naval unit must mentally and physical-
ly adapt to the new breadth of the spectrum of conflict. In
this regard, forces afloat must develop and maintain the
capability to deal with terrorism as well as conventional
and guerrilla warfare.
2- Categories of Terrorism
Terrorism is divided into categories based on the
location and the perpetrators of the act. These categories
are international, transnational, domestic, and state ter-
rorism. "International terrorism is an action initiated by
an individual or group controlled by a nation-state that
occurs outside that state. Transnational terrorism is an
action in the international arena initiated by an individual
or group that is not controlled by a nation-state. Domestic
terrorism is an action initiated by an individual or group
of nationals within its own nation-state. Finally, state
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terrorism consists of actions conducted by a nation-state
within its own borders." CRef. 11: p. 2H
3. Ihe Legal. Aspects
Many members of the world community have -for some
time recognized the lack o-f a legal framework for dealing
with international terrorists. In 1937, the Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism convened to ad-
dress terrorism of an international character. "The aims of
the Convention were to create mandatory rules of municipal
criminal law against terrorism and to make terrorism an
extraditable crime." CRef. 12: p. 264 D Only one country
ratified the Convention and it never came into force.
The 1937 Convention and other attempts to codify
terrorism have encountered two major obstacles: "first, the
dubious states of wars of national liberation and secondly,
the highly treasured right of states to grant asylum to
political offenders." CRef. 13: p. 96D Both of these items
are enmeshed in the lack of consensus regarding an accept-
able definition of terrorism, which was discussed earlier.
Although there has been no success in obtaining a
universal agreement concerning the legal controls of inter-
national terrorism, many nations have adopted a policy which
deals with particular types of terrorist incidents. Bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements have been made to prevent
specific kinds of terrorist acts without addressing a defi-
nition of terrorism. The Hague convention against hijacking
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and the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage are
the most notable and widely accepted of such agreements.
Conventions of this nature deal with specific terrorist
tactics that endanger human rights and the interests of the
international community as a whole and require "signatory-
states to either prosecute or extradite offenders found in
their territory." CRef. 14: p. 93H While these efforts are
not universal in nature, they do provide a starting point
for further legal steps.
Whereas international terrorism does not yet fall
under any world-wide legal authority, there is a legal
precedent for war. The laws of war are based on the theory
that man can come together and work together in a rational
manner. War is generally viewed as an armed conflict be-
tween regular forces attached to the apparatus of states.
The laws of war go to great lengths to identify the forces
or combatants, limit the scope of violence, and protect
noncombatants. During a war violence is permissible and the
killing of the enemy is referred to as excusable homicide.
The laws of war seek to measure the appropriateness and
proportionality of violence in an effort to reduce it. The
classical view of war involves conventional forces geared to
a certain concept of conflict among rational men, as
sketched above, and also interprets an act of violence as an
act of war. Thus, even though they are acts of violence,
terrorist acts are not clearly covered by the laws of war
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because they do not fit the classical concept o-f war in that
they are not considered to be rational or conventional by
governments.
How do the ideas pertaining to the legal aspects o-f
war and international terrorism relate to a naval ship?
Without delving into the historical development of the
application of international law to a nation's armed ves-
sels, the following simply sketches the accepted conclu-
sions. Sovereignty is associated with naval vessels. A
sovereign's public instrumentalities (naval vessels) are
immune to foreign control without the sovereign's consent
CRef. 15: p. 733.
The point to be made here is that the nature of the
international environment has changed and the concept of war
is in a stage of metamorphosis. A fresh look at armed
conflict and its participants is in order with respect to
the laws of war. In this light, terrorism has entered the
gray area between an unlawful criminal act and an unlawful
act of war CRef. 16: p. 423. International forces are
dealing with the matter but results are far aver the hori-
zon. The first hurdle to overcome is a definition agreed on
by all parties which appropriately incorporates all of the
categories of terrorism discussed earlier. In the interim,
support is lent to the Long Commission Report that "the DOD
definition needs to incorporate the reality that sovereign
20
states may use terrorism directly or through surrogates.
"
CRef. 13: p. 43 1
B. A TERRORIST PROFILE (WHO)
Thus far it has been observed that counterterrori st
efforts are dealing with revolutionary groups that conduct
acts of violence on symbolic targets to change political
behavior and attitudes. This investigation will continue by-
analyzing the perpetrators.
1 lQdLy_i_dual_s
What is the makeup o-f a terrorist? One study con-
ducted in the late seventies by Russell and Miller CRe-f. 17:
pp. 21-34D turned away -from the trend of focusing on the
mechanics of terrorism and researched eighteen terrorist
groups in an attempt to examine the individuals involved in
terrorist activities. Factors motivating the terrorists'
actions were analyzed to see if there were any common charac-
teristics. While their research only skimmed the surface of
a new approach to studying terrorists, it is generally
consistent with more recent investigations and provides some
interesting insights into terrorism.
The following profile addresses the physical makeup
and backgrounds of terrorist individuals. The cadre of
membership consists primarily of single men between the ages
of twenty-two and twenty-four. The leadership age bracket
is around thirty-five to fifty. Women are used
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predominantly in support roles such as intelligence collec-
tors, couriers, nurses, and in the maintenance of safe
houses. There have been exceptions to the last generaliza-
tion but practical experience has proven that women are more
effective in a supportive role. The terrorist individual
tends to be well educated, having some university training
or holding an undergraduate or graduate degree. This would
account for the primary place of recruitment being the
university campus. The leadership as well tends to be
highly educated. The terrorist individual generally comes
from an affluent middle to upper middle class family. His
political philosophy tends to be one of anarchism, Marxism-
Leninism, or nationalism. CRef. 17: p. 323
While some of the above trends vary slightly between
geographical or cultural areas of the world, the generalisa-
tions for these ideological and social revolutionary groups
seem to be accurate: single men between the ages of twenty-
two and twenty-four coming from affluent middle to upper
class families with some university education. "They are
not usually the lunatic fringe of same radical movement,
wantonly throwing bombs and committing random acts of vio-
lence against some ill defined establishment. Nor are they
from the downtrodden, deprived, and uneducated socioeconomic
classes." CRef. 18: p. 1933
One study did note that there was a distinction
between the members of nationalist separatist groups
compared to ideological and social revolutionary groups.
The -formers' membership, especially the rank and -file,
tended to be young people but from lower class backgrounds.
CRef. 19: p. 1243 Nevertheless, the higher education of the
leaders gave them the "confidence and skills to carry out
their activities." CRef. 20: p. 3183
2- QC9.§QL?.§t.lQQ
There is a characteristic compartmentalized struc-
ture within the terrorist organization that is employed by
the vast majority of currently active terrorist movements.
"The optimum size Cof a political movement] appears to be
between 1500 and 2500 operatives, and the minimum for a
viable terrorist cell is four or five members." CRef. 21:
p. 112H A cascading effect in all directions from the
terrorist hierarchy to the cell through branches, regions,
districts, or columns compliments the nature of terrorist
strategy and tactics. Generally, only one member of each
cell is assigned as leader and link man with the higher
echelon or with other cells CRef. 20: p. 312H. The singular
link man enhances security by ensuring that few members are
fully aware of the scope of the links or the identity of
different cell members. Often the members within a cell are
long time friends.
In order to preserve the integrity of the organiza-
tion and maintain tight security, the terrorist group uses
several cautious techniques to relay information within the
group. The use of dead drops is one such method. In a dead
drop, a location such as an airport locker is selected for
the purpose of exchanging a message without the sender or
receiver meeting. Another method uses cut-outs, members of
the organization whose only job is to deliver or collect
messages. CRef. 22: p. 1343
Such controlled organization and communications
makes it easier to achieve secrecy and surprise and to evade
capture and surveillance by security forces. The members of
the cell itself are given the minimum necessary information
about the organization to help prevent infiltration and to
ensure that if captured, they are of little value during
interrogation.
C. TECHNIQUE (HOW)
The "how" question is the most straightforward and deals
with the terrorist act itself. There are countless examples
of these acts—assassinations, hijackings, bombings, and
kidnappings, to name a few. The significance is that the
act is the heart of the matter. Terrorism is the technique
employed in pursuit of the ultimate goal of the terrorist
and must be challenged. In order to determine the possible
threats to ships it is necessary to focus on the spectrum of
terrorist actions.
There are several computer data bases of terrorist inci-
dents compiled by various agencies of the government and
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several private -firms. 3 These data bases consist of various
the terrorist group, the act committed, the date, the loca-
tion, the target, and the success status. The- fol 1 owing is




Explosive bombs Barricade and hostage
Kidnapping Break-in/theft
Other (eg. , shootout)
The -following discussion is provided to demonstrate
various means of analyzing the data. The data being re-
viewed are an example from Shultz tabulated from 1968 to
1978. An analysis of the geographical distribution of inci-
dents shows that western Europe suffers the greatest number
of incidents and the Middle East/North Africa the third
most. Their combined total is slightly more than fifty per
cent
.
Another interesting analysis is to ascertain if certain
incidents are more prevalent in certain geographical areas.
The breakdown shows that assassination, barricade-hostage
incidents, and all three categories of bombings listed above
are dominant in Western Europe. Armed attacks and hijack-
ings are dominant in the Middle East/North Africa. In the
incendiary and explosive bombs category Western Europe ranks
first and the Middle East/North Africa third and together
3For example, Edward Mickolus' data base, International
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE).
they account -for more than -Fifty per cent o-f all the bomb-
ings world-wide. A review o-f the list o-f incidents by
geographical area shows that either Western Europe or the
Middle East/North A-frica dominate all but one category,
kidnapping (Latin America dominates this category).
"The specific types of people targeted are usually those
at the top of industrial, governmental, or military/police
hierarchies (judges, politicians, military/police personnel,
corporate executives)." ERef. 23: p. 121 In view of this,
it would be useful to analyze terrorist targets, specifical-
ly U. S. citizens or property. U. S. military officials or
property account for only about sixteen per cent of the
attacks. Other categories of U. S. targets analyzed were
U. S. diplomatic officials, other government officials, U. S,
business executives, U. S. private citizens, and their res-
pective properties.
Of all the types of attacks on U. S. citizens, incendi-
ary and explosive bombings were the most prevalent, account-
ing for os/er seventy per cent of the incidents. Western
Europe and the Middle East/North Africa were the predominant
locations for these bombings. The manner in which the
bombings Are executed may consist of a car bomb, a truck-
load of dynamite, a suitcase bomb, or a variety of other
imaginative methods.
"What the above evidence suggests is that over the last
decade the international system has experienced a
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significant proliferation of terrorist incidents." CRef.
11: p. 15] One study conducted in 1979 stated "that ter-
rorists, with minor exceptions . . . have not been 'ter
—
ribly' creative to date. The potential, yet untapped, for
this operational creativity lies in modern technology."
CRef. 23: p. 133 The common technology of communications
and transportation alone offer the terrorist increased in-
telligence gathering capability and mobilization.
1 • U^e of Weapons Technology
Examples of the use of modern technology coupled
with terrorist ingenuity against maritime targets is pro-
vided below. Some of the actions recorded to date include
hijackings, ships destroyed by mines and bombs, and attacks
with bazookas. Further instances involve limpet mines at-
tached by scuba divers, rockets fired from small speed
boats, and an explosives-filled freighter armed with 122 mm
rockets CRef. 21: p. 4 3.
One journalist reported that Colonel Qadaffi of
Libya had obtained some remotely controlled boats from Swe-
den CRef. 25: p. 2373. These boats are capable of speeds up
to thirty knots and of control from distances of twenty
nautical miles. A unique threat to a ship's safety is
definitely presented if one or more of these boats were to
be configured with explosives and targeted against a ship in
open water or in confined straits. A precedent for this
technique has been successfully employed against the Spanish
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navy. The Basques "used an explosi ves—f i 1 led , radio-
controlled model boat to damage" CRef. 24: p. 53 a destroyer-
while it was moored in Santander, Spain.
The example o-f the attack with bazookas occurred in
the Strait of Bab el Mandeb when Palestinian terrorists
attacked an oil tanker from a speed boat firing ten bazooka
shells CRef. 24: p. 93. Details of the type of bazooka and
the type of speed boat employed were not enumerated. How-
ever, it is assumed that the bazooka was an RPG-7.
The mi 1 i tary—industri al complex worldwide is making
advances in weaponry at an alarming rate. Because of this
progress "large numbers of these new weapons will quickly
become obsolete and disposed of through arms dealers and
other avenues." CRef. 22: p. 273 Man-portable weaponry,
other than personal weapons such as rifles and pistols, has
expanded the scope of the threat. "Of particular concern
are precision-guided munitions (PGM's)." CRef. 26: p. 123
The SA-7 and RPS-7 are two examples.
The SA-7 is a shoulder launched surface to air-
missile with a range of nearly two nautical miles and an
infrared heat seeking guidance system CRef. 27: p. 1513. It
has been employed in several locations. One example in-
volved terrorists positioned on a balcony near Rome's inter-
national airport with an SA-7 targeting an Israeli airliner
CRef. 28: p. 1423.
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The RPG-7 is a portable rocket/grenade launcher
produced by the Soviets. It has a range o-f about 1000 yards
and can pierce armor up to 12.6 inches in thickness CRef.
27: p. 1513. Two examples serve to describe the potential
use of this weapon by terrorists. The first involved an
attack on an airliner at a Paris international airport CRef.
17: p. 316]. The second involved an attack on a U. S. Army
general in Germany while traveling in his automobile.
These types of weapons ^rs abundant and many are
shuttled into Europe through a pipeline from the Middle East
CRef. 29: p. 643. Presumably, more sophisticated weapons
already in the hands of some organizations in the Middle
East could be supplied in the future. The arsenal available
to these groups may even include mines. The 1984 mining of
the Red Sea serves as a grim reminder.
From July to September 1984 the world's interest was
captivated by a series of mining incidents in the Red Sea.
A multinational mine countermeasures force responded to the
crisis at the request of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and assisted
them by sweeping portions of the Red Sea for mines to ensure
the safe navigation of international maritime traffic. Nine-
teen merchant ships suffered varying degrees of damage from
the mines. The mine that was recovered was found to be
Soviet-made and, while there is no conclusive evidence as to
whom the culprit was, the circumstances point to Libya's
involvement CRef. 30: pp, 95-1 16D.
^9
2. Modus Operandi.
Training camps have been established in many coun-
tries of the Middle East and North Africa such- as Syria,
Iraq, and Libya. Terrorist groups from Germany, Italy,
Spain, and many other countries throughout the world have
received training in these camps. Training is provided by
Soviet, Cuban, and East German instructors as well as expe-
rienced members of such groups as the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) . CRef. 31: p. 433 The training includes
the handling of explosives, the use of infantry weapons,
bridge demolition and minelaying, the arranging of ambushes,
and information gathering CRef. 29: p. 631.
An analysis of each group's activities shows that in
most cases a particular faction prefers certain techniques
over others. For example, the Red Brigade (REO in Italy
prefers kidnapping and sabotage while the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) involves itself primarily
in hijackings. This suggests that an analysis of activities
indigenous to the area of operations may enable the command
to -focus on certain aspects of security and target hardening
prior to arriving in port. Sources of this type of informa-
tion will be addressed later.
3. Execution
The type of operation to be mounted will dictate the
amount of preparation required. The placement of a suitcase
bomb in a train station may not require the detailed
planning necessary -for a kidnapping. However, relative to the
theme of this study, it is assumed that the provisions for
an attack against a naval unit would entail some detailed
preparation.
As with any military operation, the level of compe-
tency of the individual is a key factor in the operation's
success. For this reason, terrorist groups and their spon-
sors place a lot of emphasis on the training of the indivi-
dual. The training of terrorists generalized earlier will
be elaborated on at this point. The personal account of the
training of a Japanese Red Army member in Lebanon will be
used as an example.
The training was described as that expected in any
military organization. The initial phase consisted of a
course of physical fitness. Further instruction, lasting
eight weeks, included bomb construction, detonator handling,
pistol and rifle training, and grenade usage. CRef. 27: p.
68D. Other courses such as how to use disguises were also
provided. More sophisticated instruction, including the
employment of anti-aircraft missiles, naval training, and
flight instruction, is available at some Libyan camps CRef.
31: p. 421. Special training for particular operations is
also available.
The terrorist operation from conception to execution
resembles a military campaign. There is strong evidence of
detailed planning in the early stages supported by extensive
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intelligence gathering. A balance among objectives, skills,
and available resources is sought. A search for the tar-
get's weak points is conducted. Finally, an assessment o-f
the risk involved is calculated. Once a plan has been
adopted, a dry run may be enacted to correct any -flaws.
One element o-f contemporary terrorism that tends to
complicate anti- and counter terrorist measures is the co-
operation that exists among many different terrorist groups.
Such cooperation is evident in the training discussed ear-
lier as well as in the transfer of weapons. There is also a
technology transfer among terrorists. One tactic employed
by one group may show up employed by another group geograph-
ically removed. The techniques that have proven successful
have been emulated by others. CRef. 26: p. 63
Cooperation can include joint operations such as the
Carlos-led attack on the OPEC ministers in Vienna, which
included Palestinian, West German, and Venezuelan operatives
CRef. 28: p. 1453. Another example of cooperation are
attacks by proxy where one group carries out attacks for
another group's cause CRef. 10: p. 3173. Here it can be
surmised that groups whose activities have never included
U. S. military targets may initiate an attack by proxy or as
a payment to a benefactor that provides support in the way
of training and arms.
In summary, the effectiveness of a terrorist attack
relies on the fundamental element of surprise. Terrorist
operations can be characterized as being relatively simple
but well planned and orchestrated. Terrorist acts are dis-
tinguished by ingenuity and resourcefulness. The time and
place of an attack are decided upon by the terrorists in-
volved and a tremendous amount o-f effort is concentrated on
making this tactic successful. Thus, a terrorist attack
will usually be carefully planned, rehearsed to perfection,
and executed flawlessly.
The above discussion is intended to give the com-
manding officer of a naval vessel an appreciation of the
nature of terrorist attacks. He is encouraged to scrutinize
his ship's security measures through the eyes of a terror-
ist. First, the commanding officer is urged to look at his
ship's security measures from the inside and, then, to stand
back and look at the security plan from the outside, being
constantly alert for weak spots.
D. MOTIVATION (WHY)
The fourth area of analysis addresses the why question:
what are the goals, motivations, and strategies of terror-
ism. According to the definition of terrorism accepted for
the intent of this study, the motivation behind a terrorist
act is considered to be primarily oriented towards political
goals as part of a revolutionary strategy. In this regard,
political terrorists can be divided into five categories.
The first category consists o-f a group of people within
a country who consider themselves to be an ethnic minority
and seek to establish a separate state. Such groups are
commonly referred to as separatist movements. The second
category of political terrorists, the nationalists, are
similar to the separatists but enjoy a larger following and
have more resources at their disposal. The third category
is ideological and may be made up of either right or left
wing factions. The fourth is the issue-oriented group that
seeks changes in the existing government. A fifth category-
uses terrorism to a political end as a pretext for socio-
pathic behavior. This last group is very uncommon. CRef.
11: p. 4; Ref. 20: p. 312; Ref . 23: p. 31]
The orientations enumerated above may also be looked
upon as ultimate goals. In pursuing these goals, interme-
diate goals are established as stepping stones to the ulti-
mate objective. One example of an intermediate goal is
establishing recognition of the movement.
In pursuing the intermediate goals, subgoals are estab-
lished that are of a tactical (short term) or strategic
(long term) nature. Subgoals of a tactical character may be
publicity, funding, prisoner exchange, or damage. A strate-
gic subgoal may be undermining the will of the government
which erodes over time due to the successful achievement of
the terrorists' short term subgoals.
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The methods (kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, etc.)
used by terrorists to achieve tactical, or short-term, sub-
goals have the greatest impact on the public. A classic
example is the hostage and barricade incident at the 1972
Olympic Games in Munich. The Black September terrorist
group took and held eleven Israeli athletes hostage in a
dormitory of the Olympic Village. The terrorists demanded
the release o-f 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel in
exchange for the eleven athletes. Their demands were not
met and a rescue attempt was made resulting in the massacre
o-f the eleven Israeli athletes by the Black September ter-
rorists. Even though one tactical subgoal
,
the release o-f
the 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel, was not realized, a
second tactical subgoal, the -focusing o-f public attention on
the Palestinian cause, succeeded tremendously.
In pursuing an objective, a terrorist organization must
decide what will best suit the aim—destruction or disrup-
tion. For example, if the goal is money, then kidnapping
for ransom may be selected. If the goal is to obtain the
release of prisoners, then a hijacking may be planned. If
the goal is to get publicity, then a bombing, assassination,
or attack on a ship may be chosen. Once the terrorist group
has determined the nature of the goal and the method to be
used to reach that goal, it then begins a search for an
appropriate target. In the mind of a terrorist these
actions are a means to an end. The "calculated tactics are
to rivet attention and create alarm." CRef. 26: p. 53
From the point of view of the target group, the funda-
mental purpose behind terrorist attacks may be generalized
as fear. Terrorist activities create a psychological effect
on the target group with possible intentions of changing
their political behavior and attitudes. "Terrorism's value
to revolutionary movements is not proportional to its ex-
pense, but to its psychological effectiveness." CRef. 1: p.
3873 The psychological condition has been termed extreme
fear or anxiety and is created largely by the unpredict-
ability of terrorist acts CRef. 1: p. 389]. The fear and
anxiety are generated by the fact "that terrorists may
recognize no ethical or humanitarian limits to their use of
violence: any means are permissible and everyone (including
civilians, women, children, and neutrals) is expendable in
the interests of 'revolution,' 'justice,' or 'liberation.'"
CRef. 21: p. 1003
The principles of operation in the strategic framework
of modern terrorism may be said to have developed with the
growth of modern revolution. Targets are hit with the
intent of producing maximum psychological impact. To this
end the element of surprise and a concentration of force are
the fundamental advantages possessed by the weak, developing
revolutionary movement. The effectiveness for the terrorist
rests in the symbolism of the act and the publicity
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received, both o-f which Are enhanced by the element of
surprise.
The strategy involves a method o-f -fighting that will
stalemate the opponent's superior forces and raise his ex-
pense to an unacceptable level. There-fore, methods o-f
exploiting technology Are devised, such as hijacking air
—
craft and taking advantage o-f the electronic news media.
Ant i -terrorist efforts must focus on the techniques used
in the execution of a terrorist operation. If the designer
of a ship's security shield against a terrorist incident
possesses a good understanding of the various techniques
employed by terrorists, then the effectiveness of that
shield will be greatly enhanced. Again, it must be empha-
sized that the designer of the anti-terrorist shield analyze
the security scheme through the eyes of the terrorist.
E. THE REMAINING QUESTIONS (WHERE AND WHEN)
Studies have analyzed where and when terrorist incidents
have occurred and have attempted to predict where and when
they will happen next. For the most part, these attempts
have been unsatisfactory because of the random nature of
terrorist incidents as part of a strategy to induce general
fear and uneasiness. All is not lost though. Studies have
proven helpful by compiling valuable information regarding
what types of events to guard against, what style particular
groups employ, and what targets Are attacked.
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Security specialists have used this information to de-
vise various methods -for protection o-f establishments and
personnel. Some corporations track terrorist activities and
provide businesses with regional threat assessments. Ef-
forts have been made in the psychological community to
provide training in hostage incidents. People are taught
how to behave as hostages if abducted and negotiators are
trained to deal with the abductors.
The single most important ingredient for predicting
terrorist incidents is information. This vital information
is, however, extremely hard to get because of the cellular
organization of terrorist groups which limits information
flow within the group, the covert nature of the operations
which are shrouded in secrecy, and the tactics employed
which are usually executed by surprise. Thus extraordinary
measures are being taken to expand the human intelligence
capacity of today's countermeasure efforts.
Another way of neutralizing terrorist efforts is to
closely monitor the activities of groups world-wide and
maintain a finger on the pulse of the political climate in
each country. This can provide a threat assessment for a
particular area and lend support to a command's anti-
terrorist posture. One such effort is being achieved by the
Navy Anti-terrorist Alert Center (ATAC)
.
The ATAC has recently been organized within the Naval
Investigative Service Headquarters to provide a fusion
center for worldwide "all sources" intelligence regarding
terrorist activities. A threat analysis branch uses the
information to provide threat assessments.
The "all sources" intelligence is collected -from various
sources including national and service intelligence agencies
and foreign news searches. The volume of information being
reviewed often exceeds 1600 messages in a twenty-four hour
period. Watch teams are in communication with other agen-
cies via computer link to compare analyses and evaluations
of key information and sensitive data. The primary world-
wide field network associated with ATAC is the Naval Inves-
tigative Service (NIS)
.
The results of the analysis and assessment are several
products distributed by message: summaries, advisories,
warning reports, supplements, and tailored reports. All
products are available to the fleet as required. Table 1
shows the periodicity of promulgation of these products. 4*




Warning reports As required
Supplements As required
Tailored reports On request
Information provided by ATAC, Washington, D. C,
How does one get an ATAC message? There are two methods
dependent on the -fleet o-f operation. For Mediterranean
operations CINCUSNAVEUR will request ATAC support for a ship
based on the ship's schedule. In WESTPAC units must request
a threat assessment in the LOGREQ. In either case, ATAC
support will be oriented -from the grass roots level, that
is, the closest NIS o-f-fice will initiate the support as they
are more -familiar with the local conditions. Finally, tai-
lored support can be requested -far short notice schedule
changes or major -fleet exercises requiring threat assess-
ments. Requests should be submitted to DIRNAVINVSERV, Wash-
ington, D. C. or through the local NIS office.
The ATAC products will provide a threat assessment based
on risk indicators from low to high in five increments:
low, low/medium, medium, medium/high, and high as shown in
Table 2.° The question then raised is, what should a ship
do for any one of the above indicators?
The choices available cover a wide spectrum from busi-
ness as usual to getting underway. The ship's current
conditions, whether at sea, at anchor, or alongside a pier,
will also help determine the best strategy for dealing with
the threat. Table 3 is a hierarchical spectrum of possible
actions to be taken with each threat level, with the
Information provided by ATAC, Washington, D. C.
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Terrorist group capability does not
exist or exists without any known intent
to target DON. No credible reporting of
planned operations. Local security
forces have any threat under control .
Terrorist group capability to strike so-ft
targets exists—none against hard targets,
No recent anti-DON activity.
Unsubstantiated reports of planned
attacks in near future. Local security
have general control of situation but
group still capable.
Capability exists to strike soft and
possibly hard targets. Stated intent to
attack U. S. /DON/NATO assets with some
demonstrated capability in past.
Capability exists to hit soft and
probably hard targets. stated intent to
attack U. S. /DON/NATO targets with
recent successful OPS. History of anti-
U. S. actions. Credible reporting of
planned attacks in near future. Local
security not able to prevent or detect
planned attacks.
Capability exists to hit any
U. S. /DON/NATO target in area. Stated
and recently demonstrated threat to
attack these targets exists. Reliable
reporting indicates threat is imminent.
No further warning expected. Local
security not able to prevent or detect
planned attacks.
understanding that each command must establish its own doc-
trine and incorporate it into watch training.
Prior to making a port visit, a port security plan
should be drawn up taking into consideration the threat
assessment and other factors such as the berthing
41
assignment. The fleet commander may ask for such a plan by
message prior to entering port.
One way to ascertain the current status of- terrorist
activities and draw up tailored port security plans is by
developing an anti-terrorist billet. A suggestion toward
this end would be to couple the duties of an "anti -terrorist
officer" with those of the intelligence officer on board.
In this capacity the officer can aid in port security
planning and work with the security officer to ensure that
the proper precautions ^re taken in each port commensurate
with the type of threat.
TABLE 3 THREAT LEVEL—RESPONSE
POSSIBLE ACTION IHREAT LEVEL
Business as usual LOW
Notify chain of command LOW/MEDIUM
Call NIS for update MEDIUM
No uniforms ashore
Upgrade material conditions
No large parties ashore
All visitors removed
Cancel visit ship
Set steaming watch MEDIUM/HIGH
Cars removed from pier
Pier sentry doubled
Topside security reinforced
Request bomb sniffing dogs to check
del i ver ies
Sand-filled dump trucks placed on pier
Armed watches load weapons HIGH
Smal 1 boats recovered






Post visit reports could prove bene-ficial to the ATAC if
information regarding questionable activities or people has
been observed. The crew's training in terrorist profiles
and activities may produce useful intelligence if a feedback
program is used and information is solicited on a daily-
basis or immediately following a port visit. A review of
post visit reports prior to transmission with this in mind
may add valuable information to the ATAC data base. If
appropriate, add DIRNAVINVSERV as an information addressee.
Another valuable source of information at the command's
finger tips is the port directory classified supplement
issued by the fleet intelligence centers. This publication,
updated regularly, provides descriptions of groups, activi-
ties, and a general assessment of capabilities. It will
prove to be a beneficial tool for crew briefings prior to
entering port.
At this point, the fundamentals of design and execution
of terrorist operations have been presented. Such informa-
tion should provide personnel with the first step to tailo-
ring a security program against terrorist attacks. The core
of the anti-terrorist plan is understanding the threat. The
nucleus of the command's security efforts is its personnel.
"No hardware, however expensive, can rival the eyes, ears,
hands, and brains of man." CRef. 32: p. 144] To this end
the challenge is to maintain a high degree of alertness and
anticipation among the personnel.
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III. SECURITY SYSTEMS AND SUGGESTIONS
The increase in terrorism world-wide has led some author-
ities on the subject to speculate that terrorists may attack
maritime targets. This includes off-shore oil rigs, mer-
chant vessels, luxury liners, and naval units.
The research conducted on this thesis has not uncovered
any terrorist attacks on U. S. naval vessels. The reason
for this is perhaps due to the deterrence exemplified by a
warship's formidable presence. With the increase in technol-
ogy available to the terrorist and the imagination demon-
strated by many terrorist incidents, however, it would
definitely be advantageous for the U. S. Navy to hone the
skills of it's security forces and alert it's crews to the
potential terrorist threat. Other navies have not had the
same good fortune as the U. S. and have experienced terror-
ist attacks for common terrorist reasons: to make a point,
gain publicity, symbolically achieve a victory, etc.
Terrorist attacks against U. S. personnel and properties are
increasing and this type of embarrassing incident success-
fully carried out against a U. S. Navy ship would certainly
be a victory for a terrorist group.
What follows are some suggestions for tailoring the
Navy's security practices already in force in order to
decrease the vulnerability of a naval ship. The suggestions
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are not al 1 -encompassing but are intended to point out some
areas that could use improvement. Hopefully these ideas
will help to generate a thorough analysis of in-house proce-
dures for each ship.
The suggestions offered are based on a Sgruance class
destroyer hull design and crew manning. * For other ship
types, the spirit of the suggestion should be considered and
the techniques applied as appropriate. For all ship types
the desire is to encourage analysis of current security
procedures and to tap the ingenuity inherent in all
commands.
The intent, restated, is not to suggest that the U. S.
Navy does not have a good security system for forces afloat
or that it needs a new one, but rather to review current
security design, evaluate vulnerable points in the defensive
shield, and to suggest ways of improving it. One starting
point is with a review of current security guidance in
force.
In the armed forces, it is traditional for the percola-
tion and expansion of guidance to be disseminated by means
of instructions. In keeping with this tradition, the
Department of Defense at the top echelon of the hierarchy
AA Sgruance class destroyer is a 563 foot, 7300 ton ship
with a manning of approximately 300 crew and officers. The
same basic hull design and propulsion configuration is used
in the Ki.dd class guided missile destroyer and the
Ii£2Qderoga Aegis cruiser.
has provided broad guidance regarding security. As this
guidance cascades down the pyramid o-f the chain o-f command,
the security concepts involved become more detailed and
expansive.
The Department o-f Defense has provided policy for the
security of property and given certain military commanders
authority to promulgate regulations based on the Internal
Security Act of 1950. This directive specifically cites the
commanding officers of all naval ships as having authority
to prepare, post, and enforce security orders and regula-
tions to safeguard property from loss, destruction, or sabo-
tage CRef. 33: p. ID. The Secretary of the Navy has
endorsed this policy and issued the applicable instructions
for action by commanding officers CRef. 343.
The specifics of security ^re contained in the Standard
Organization and Regulations Manual of the U. S. Navy (SORM)
CRef. 353. These details ^re part of every naval unit's
routine security program. More specific instructions for
nuclear capable ships Are contained in the Naval Nuclear
Weapons Security Manual CRef. Z61
.
A. IMPORT SECURITY
The universal application of inport security measures
provides for a sounding and security patrol (tasked to
monitor the water level in certain unmanned spaces), an
anti -sneak/ant i -swimmer attack watch, a quarterdeck watch, a
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gangway watch (when required), security patrols, a cold iron
watch (tasked to monitor the status of main machinery spaces
when the engineering plant is secured), pier security, fore-
castle and fantail sentries, and a signal watch. Addition-
ally, instructions establish provisions for a self-defense
force. The specific requirements for a nuclear capable ship
Are in addition to those mentioned above and addressed in a
separate and more detailed instruction.
B. THE QUARTERDECK
In a historical sense, physical security starts at the
quarterdeck. The Officer of the Deck (ODD) in port is
charged with carrying out the routine of the ship and at-
tending to the gangway (s). The 00D ' s watch monitors the
movement of personnel across the brow and authorizes access
to or permission to depart the ship. Likewise, the contents
of all items carried aboard must be inspected. The 00D
generally has a petty officer of the watch (armed) and a
messenger as a minimum for assistance. He may also be
assisted by a junior officer of the deck or others under
instruction. The task of identifying all personnel and
checking everything coming on board can prove to be an
unmanageable task, especially when the quarterdeck is over-
whelmed by a large crowd (some of which require escorts).
This situation is aggravated by the limited size of most
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quarterdecks and can lead to con-fusion, distract the ODD
from his duties, and dull his alertness.
Suggestion: Set the gangway watch and conduct identifi-
cation checks, issue appropriate access badges, organize
escorts, and inspect items being carried aboard -From the
pier rather than on the quarterdeck. During times of heavy-
traffic, this gangway watch can be augmented by the messen-
ger. Overall, this will reduce confusion and congestion on
the quarterdeck, allow for another layer of security, and
maintain alertness on the quarterdeck.
According to the SORM, the remaining patrol, watches,
and sentries are charged with the following responsibilities
in discharging their duties:
Maintaining continuous patrols.
Checking classified storage.
Being alert for evidence of sabotage, thievery, and
fire hazards.
Checking security of weapons magazines.
Obtaining periodic soundings of designated tanks and
spaces.
Periodically inspecting damage control closures.
Reporting to the 00D at prescribed intervals.
C. SOUNDING AND SECURITY PATROLS
Specifically, the sounding and security patrol (unarmed)
fulfills two important jobs. First, the patrol, which is
continuous, follows irregular routes throughout the ship to
sound specific tanks and voids to ensure they ars "dry."
Secondly, the patrol is charged with being constantly alert
for any irregularities effecting the physical security of
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the ship. The patrol is usually confined to the interior of
the ship and must report to the 00D hourly.
Suggestion: This job is usually considered a tedious
task and is at the bottom of certain rate qualification
processes. Consequently, it is many times given to an
inexperienced, new individual while "more important" posi-
tions are filled by more senior personnel. In the process
of ship and job indoctrination, the importance of the patrol
must be emphasized with a genuine regard for understanding
the impact the individual has over many peoples's lives and
millions of dollars of equipment. The development of an
acute sense for spotting irregularities, calmly reacting to
them, and reporting them to the 00D in a timely fashion may,
in part, be accomplished through the first part of this
handbook—education.
D. ANTI-SNEAK/ANTI-SWIMMER ATTACK BILL
The anti-sneak/anti-swimmer attack watch is posted at
the discretion of the commanding officer. The number of
topside watches and positions are recommended by the opera-
tions and executive officers. The anti -sneak/anti-swimmer
watch is charged with watching for swimmers and, if deemed
necessary, discharging hand grenades in the water against
swimmers. The watch can be supplemented by a picket boat
crew and sonar can be manned (if the ship is so configured)
and activated randomly. Both techniques have proven very
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e-f-fective in discouraging swimmers from approaching the
ship. Other measures call -for turning over the screws and
cycling the rudder as a deterrent against swimmers. All o-f
these defenses could prove expedient given adequate intelli-
gence to coordinate and execute them.
E. FORECASTLE AND FANTAIL WATCH/PIER SENTRY
One watch, required overseas, that would -facilitate the
detection o-f an attack by swimmers is the -forecastle and
fantail watch. This watch, when required in the continental
United States (CONUS) , is normally posted from dusk to dawn
but is continuous when in port overseas. The watch standers
are armed with a rifle and thirty rounds and issued a police
whistle and flashlight. The watch is posted on the fore-
castle and the fantail and charged with preventing unauthor-
ized persons from approaching or coming aboard. In the
event unidentified personnel do approach, the appropriate
challenge would be issued and assistance called for by using
the whistle.
In addition to the forecastle and fantail watch, a pier
security patrol, similarly armed, is charged with patrol-
ling the portion of the pier between the bow and stern of
the ship. Besides preventing unauthorized access, the pa-
trolman shall also prevent loitering on the pier near the
ship.
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Suggestion: A more effective position from which the
forecastle and fantail watch could perform their duties
against a threat from sea or from the pier is from the 04
level forward and aft. When moored pierside this would
increase the height of eye for searching seaward and provide
a better field of fire both to seaward and towards the pier.
The inspection of the stem and stern of the ship would then
be provided by the pier sentry since the view from the 04
level is obstructed.
Flexible modifications to the watch manning proposed
above can be easily undertaken for other mooring configura-
tions. For example:
1. If at anchor, the pier sentry should be reassigned to
patrol the weatherdecks while the forecastle and fan-
tail watch remain on the 04 level.
2. If in a Med moor (stern to the pier with the bow
secured by anchors) , an armed gangway watch can sub-
stitute for the pier sentry allowing the pier sentry
to patrol the weatherdecks and the 04 level watches to
remain topside.
3. If in a Med moor with two or more ships in a nest, the
senior officer present should coordinate a combination
of the patrols and sentries among the nested ships to
provide the same coverage. For example, if three
ships are moored in a nest, one pier sentry can cover
all three. The outboard ships can provide the 04
level watches and the middle ship in the nest can
provide the main deck patrol which inspects all anchor
chains.
The 04 level also has other advantages. For example,
the 04 level forward provides signal lights that can be used
to illuminate the area. There is also room for the place-
ment of a night observation device to improve investigating
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capabilities. Both watches should be outfitted with port-
able radios so that they can communicate with the QOD and
between themselves to verify or check potential targets.
The roving patrol can check on each man every hal-f hour
while making his rounds and report the status to the 00D.
Suggestion: When "Med lights" or other lighting decora-
tions are installed on the lifelines, they should be lowered
to approximately one foot below the main deck to prevent
blinding or ruining of night vision. This placement of the
lights would also improve visibility on the surface of the
water in the immediate vicinity of the ship. Another alter-
native that could be used with "Med lights" is to shield the
lights from the ship. This alternative, however, may prove
ineffective and be more trouble than it is worth.
F. FIRE FIGHTING TEAMS
In the event the ship is the focus of demonstrations
which might escalate to riot proportions, fire fighting
teams could be called out to help allay the violence. The
firefighting teams could use water jets to discourage the
mob's advancement. High pressure and cold water may halt
the attackers or, at least, cause confusion among them and
slow their advancement. In this capacity, hose teams from
the fire fighting squads must be trained to report to cer-
tain locations topside to flake and charge hoses and to use
them as a deterrent against poorly armed attackers. There
may be situations where the use of -firehoses would be more
proportional to the control o-f poorly armed attackers than
more forceful means.
G. SECURITY PATROL/SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
The provisions for an armed, roving security patrol on
non-nuclear capable ships should be in effect to augment the
sounding and security patrol. Specifically, the patrolman
is charged with concentrating on the security of classified
stowage, restricted spaces, small arms, and ammunition sto-
wage. During his random patrols he reports to the 00D at
least every half hour. In the event of an alert, he is
available to provide an armed escort for the command duty
officer.
The self-defense force is available to be called away to
augment the normal watch and other security personnel. The
responsibility of the self-defense force is to provide a
surge capability for reacting to emergency security situa-
tions on board ship and pierside. Its organization is based
on the size of the ship's complement, using a ratio of one
thirteen-man squad (squad leader plus three four-man teams)
per two hundred crew members.
Suggestion: The self-defense force squads could benefit
significantly from training at a Marine Corps or Army facil-
ity. Methods for advancing towards the threat, designating
targets, and coordinating firing on target could be valuable
lessons. Likewise, the use of ammunitions relative to the
circumstances can be learned.
H. NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHIPS' SECURITY
On nuclear capable ships, a security alert team (SAT),
back-up alert -force (BAF) , and a reserve -force are provided
to augment the roving patrol for security violations ERef.
36: pp. 1-811.
The roving patrol is assigned similar duties to those on
non-nuclear capable ships and additionally must inspect
magazines, launchers, and designated equipment while on
patrol. He also reports to the 00D at least every half
hour.
The SAT consists of a minimum of two security force
personnel, in addition to those on watch at established
security posts, capable of immediate response to any irregu-
larity as a reinforcing element in a minimum of five min-
utes. They are assigned specific stations.
The BAF consists of a minimum of three security force
members in addition to those on watch, those at established
sentry posts, and the SAT. The BAF must be capable of
responding in a minimum of ten minutes and are also assigned
specific stations.
The reserve force consists of a minimum of ten members
of the security force capable of responding in a minimum of
fifteen minutes to support other on-duty security farce
personnel
.
A timely response to a surprise terrorist attack is
critical. "Timely" in the terrorist scenario is de-fined in
terms o-f seconds. The -five minute response time allowed the
SAT would probably be inadequate in a terrorist situation
but is significant for reinforcing security personnel on
watch. The first line of defense aboard a ship lies with
the personnel on watch. Because of the very real possibili-
ty of an armed attack against a naval vessel, it is impor-
tant to allow personnel on watch to carry loaded weapons
whenever the ship is is in a high threat or potentially
hostile environment. It may also be prudent to consider
assigning armed men (in a relaxed posture in a designated
space onboard ship) capable of responding to an alarm in one
minute or less to support the personnel on watch.
I. DURESS SYSTEM
Onboard ship, a duress system allows an individual under
duress to covertly make his predicament known to others on
the ship. In the event of a terrorist attack the duress
system will activate a security alert without revealing to
the attacker that his presence is known. For example, if
the roving patrol does not check in with the 00D in person
precisely thirty minutes after his previous report, the 00D
,
as a matter of course, will sound a security alert using the
w»^
announcing system and will activate the appropriate alarms.
If the roving patrol can convince his assailant that he must
call in to the 00D to avoid an alert, he can tip the OQD
that all is not secure. The fact that the roving patrol
called in and did not report to the QOD in person would
immediately indicate to the ODD that there was a problem.
In response to the tip, the 00D can alert the ship to a
security breach by using a code word over the announcing
system rather than the security alarm system which overtly
signals a breach of security.
Under the circumstances where an 00D observes suspicious
activity in the vicinity of a ship and wants to alert the
ship and activate the security team off watch, he could use
a duress system. By simply using a code word on the an-
nouncing system the ship and security teams could be alerted
unaware to the terrorist.
J. ARMED WATCHES, PATROLS, AND SENTRIES
The SORM specifies that pistols shall be carried un-
loaded at all times by the quarterdeck watch and that the
forecastle and fantail security watches ordinarily shall not
have their weapons loaded CRef. 35: pp. 6-49, 6-50]. There
are situations, however, in which carrying an unloaded wea-
pon could prove to be a fatal mistake. For this reason,
modification of the above orders should be given strong
consideration.
The terrorist advantage of surprise is notorious. The
split second reaction to a surprise attack required by a
naval watchstander dictates that his weapon must be loaded.
Suggestion: When the threat level o-f a ship's environ-
ment approaches the high mark, armed watchstanders should
carry their weapons loaded. Small arms and security train-
ing must emphasize when the conditions dictate the loading
o-F weapons and under whose order it is to be done. The
element of sa-fety afforded by carrying unloaded weapons must
be sacrificed in the interest of protecting personnel and
property from a surprise terrorist attack. An extensive
training program in the use of various weapons can greatly
diminish the chance of an accident occurring with loaded
weapons.
To preclude an incident similar to the bombing of the
Marine barracks in Beirut (October of 1983) from happening
against a ship in port, the commanding officers of U. S.
Navy ships must have "explicit authority to respond quickly
to acts defined as hostile." CRef. 9: p. 471 The on-scene
commander must have the "guidance and the flexibility he
requires to defend his force." CRef. 9: p. 473 The first
step toward this end is to authorize sentries to carry
loaded weapons when the environment dictates that it is
necessary.
IV. SHIPS1 VULNERABILITIES
When considering terrorist attacks, a ship is certainly
more vulnerable in restricted water than on the high seas.
But even in open water units may be exposed to remotely
controlled explosives-laden boats, armed and manned speed
boats, ultra-light aircraft with explosives, or mini-subs.
These situations are more appropriately handled by the com-
bat systems doctrine.
As a ship approaches shore, it becomes more vulnerable
because o-f the restrictions on its maneuvering capabilities.
The conditions presented below are limited to entering port
and either mooring pierside (or in a nest) or going to an
anchorage.
A. ENTERING PORT
The -following hypothetical scenario can be used to il-
lustrate at least one set o-f possible terrorist actions:
Well in advance of entering port, the special sea and
anchor detail is set. During this process, systems are
checked and all is made ready to moor alongside a pier.
Meanwhile, the excitement o-f going on liberty spreads
among the crew. The line handlers man their stations on
deck and centralized communications are established with
the bridge. The men fall into ranks as the ship nears the
breakwater. Several small boats are around and one speed
boat with an attractive female in the bow, well tanned and
wearing a skimpy white bikini, passes slowly down the port
side close aboard just prior to the ship making the break-
water. Most of the men's attention is focused on her. As
the bow clears the breakwater, a loud explosion is heard
and felt just -Forward of amidships on the starboard side.
A small boat laden with explosives just rammed the ship.
This is one scenario, melodramatic, but nonetheless
possible. The preliminary conditions Are realistic and have
undoubtedly been experienced by many. There Are countless
other potential scenarios which Are left up to the imagina-
tion of the terrorist who is planning them and the ship that
is defending against them.
Suggest i ons:
1. During the setting of the special sea and anchor
detail, increase the material condition below decks by
setting modified zebra.
2. Have M-60 machine gun stations on each bridge wing
armed and place gunners' mates just inside the skin of
the ship ready to man them.
3. Request that a pilot or military liaison officer meet
the ship prior to entering confining waters. These
men can be available to warn off suspected small boats
in the native language either with a bull horn or via
the announcing system.
4. Launch the motor whale boat or gig and have it proceed
into port ahead of the ship, alert -for potential
problems. Consideration may be given to using a heli-
copter, if embarked, for surveillance.
5. Ensure that each deck station has assigned designated
personnel who Are constantly alert for suspicious
activities. The gunners mate assigned forward and aft
should be armed to provide support from the weather
decks.
6. Call away a squad of at least five security force
personnel armed with shotguns, rifles, and pistols,
and protected with helmets and flack jackets, to stand-
by on the main deck just inside the skin of the ship.
7. Man at least one repair party, preferably the central-
ly located repair five station, ready to respond to
damage or act as a repel border team with a hose
topside.
8. Alert the shipping tracker in CIC to report any radar-
contacts proceeding -faster than ten knots with a CPA
closer than -five hundred yards inside the harbor.
Many o-f these considerations and others could be applied





While in port after being at sea -for two weeks or
more a large amount of mail is often received on board. In
their impatience to go on liberty, the postal clerk and
yeoman may hastily sort the official mail, tearing it open
without systematically examining it. Because letter bombs
are also a threat, the yeomen, personnel men , and postal
clerk (s) should be provided training in recognition of let-
ter bombs. Other than recognition, there are some common-
sense questions that should be asked such as: Why is the
ship receiving this letter/package? Has it been tampered
with? Table 4 provides a letter bomb recognition check list
for personnel to use when sorting mail CRef. 37: p. G-73.
2. Stores
Another area for concern is the loading of stares.
When fresh vegetables and fruits are received, the senior-
medical corpsman on board goes out and inspects the produce
prior to loading by the dockside working party. His inspec-
tion, however, is for medical purposes and does not include
a search for bombs. The master-at-arms should be
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— Heavier than usual
for its size.
— Heavier than usual
for its class.
THICKNESS
— For medium size
envelopes, the thickness
of a small book.
— Not uniform or with
bulges.
— For large envelopes,
bulkiness, an inch or
more in thickness.
ADDRESS
— No return address.
— Poorly typed or
handwritten address.
— Handprinted.




— More than enough postage.
POSTMARK
— Foreign.
— From an unusual city or
town.
WRITING
— Foreign writing style
— Misspelled words.














— Addressed to a high
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title, or department.
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trained to recognize bombs and how to conduct a search for
them. It would be easy to conceal a bomb in a head of
lettuce, for example, and get it aboard. Likewise, a
larger bomb could be easily hidden in a crate of vegetables.
All items, not just produce, should be inspected for signs
of tampering and then loaded on board. The use of a port-
able metal detector would assist in ensuring a thorough
investigation.
3. Qha.Qai.Qa the Watch
Another potential area of vulnerability exists when
watches are changed. Normally, all watches are turned over
within a ten to fifteen minute period and the watch standers
are not in the frame of mind to devote one hundred per cent
attention to the task. There is somewhat of a settling-in
and a gearing-up period to tackle the chore at hand. In
order to diminish this vulnerable period, the command's
watch turnover could be done in a cycle covering forty-five
minutes to one hour. For example, the topside sentries
could change the watch at a quarter past the hour, the
roving patrols and petty officer of the watch could relieve
at half past the hour, and the OQD and other watches could
relieve at a quarter to the hour. Furthermore, this cycle
could be shifted every other day or every third day, as it
too can reflect an observable pattern or routine.
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4. Bombs
One -final suggestion addresses the common technique
of "suitcase bombs." A bomb could be placed in a briefcase,
suitcase, small box. garbage receptacle, car , truck, or many
other potential containers, and le-ft unattended on the pier
in the proximity of a ship. All personnel should be aware
of the technique, especially the watch standers. When spot-
ted, every effort should be made to identify the container
and have it removed.
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v. QBIill management;/ leadership and contingency planning
There are certain circumstances surrounding an event
which characterise that event as a crisis. A crisis may be
described as a situation in which reaction time to the
situation is short, the stakes involved are high, and there
is no previously prepared plan to deal with the situation.
A casualty in the engineering spaces on a ship would invoke,
-for example, a crisis if casualty control procedures had not
been developed to deal with the incident. The consequence
of such a crisis would most probably be over-reactive leader-
ship to remedy the cause o-f the potential crisis situation
throughout the -fleet. A primary goal of this paper is to
stimulate the development of shipboard contingency plans
dealing with terrorist incidents and, in doing so, avoid the
over-reactive leadership style associated with a crisis.
This study encourages the training and education of a
ship's crew regarding the fundamentals of terrorism and the
analysis of the security procedures in the face of a
terrorist threat. The adjustment of the security system and
training of personnel to deter a terrorist threat are also
emphasized and represent a large part of effective counter-
terrorist techniques. All of the above efforts are related
to the internal shipboard part of a contingency plan.
Contingency planning must also consider the actors and
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-forces external to the ship that Are set in motion by a
terrorist incident. All in all, a contingency plan should
prevent a situation from being elevated to a crisis level
and provide a tool to help deal ef f ecti vel y with the circum-
stances. The -Following Are some items external to the ship
that the commanding officer should be aware of when -Formu-
lating contingency plans dealing with terrorist incidents.
A. U. S. POLICY
One pre-requi si te to counterterror i st contingency plan-
ning is a full understanding of U. S. policy regarding
terrorist incidents. First is the no-concessions policy of
the U. S. government, "meaning that the United States will
offer no ransom nor release prisoners in return for the
lives of hostages held by terrorists." CRef. 38: p. 5]
Secondly, the government will "take all possible lawful
measures to resolve the incident and to bring to justice the
perpetrators of the crime." CRef. 39: p. 2] To this end
the United States has obtained a number of bilateral inter-
national agreements that address extradition of terrorists.
Third and key to the second resolve, is the policy that "the
host nation is responsible for the protection of U. S.
personnel and installations against terrorist attacks."
CRef. 40: p. 791
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B. TREATIES AND LAW
The commanding officer of a U. S. Navy ship bears the
responsibility -for protection of personnel and. property
aboard his ship CRef. 34: p. 23- He must, therefore, have a
complete understanding of the authority vested in him to
take the appropriate counterterrori st measures in keeping
with U. S. policy, treaties of cooperation with other
nations, and both domestic and international law.
In addition to U. S. policy, another area that may
influence the counterterrori st contingency plan developed by
a U. S. naval command concerns agreements with the host
government for dealing with terrorist incidents against
U. S. citizens that occur within the host nation. Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFA) have been reached with many govern-
ments. Supplementary Agreements have been reached with some
countries which expand the allowances provided for in the
SOFA. The specifics of these agreements should be obtained
through the chain of command from the unified commander.
The following discussion concerns a U. S. Navy warship
inport in a foreign country. "While in a foreign port a
warship is not subject to any interference by the authori-
ties of the receiving state." CRef. 41: p. 1073. The
commanding officer has the responsibility and authority to
protect the ship and its personnel from a terrorist attack.
Countering a terrorist attack onboard the ship with the use
66
of force to protect the ship and personnel is clearly legal,
as was discussed in Chapter II.
Engaging a terrorist in the vicinity of a ship is also
legal but with two stipulations. First, according to U. S.
policy the host nation is responsible for the protection of
U. S. personnel and property against terrorist attacks. If
the host nation's authorities are not present, or if they
are present but are, in the judgement of the commanding
officer of the ship involved, not responding adequately to
the threat, then the commanding officer can instruct the
ship's personnel to engage the terror i st (s) . Secondly, the
terrorist threat must present a life-endangering situation
before the commanding officer of the ship can order the use
of force to engage the terrorist (s) and even then, it must
be ordered only as a last resort.
The following example will help clarify the points made
above.
A U. S. Navy ship is inport in a foreign country. The
terrorist threat levels in this particular port have been
rising and are now considered to be high. A vehicle
breaks through a barrier checkpoint on the pier and is
heading at high speed toward the ship which is moored
pierside. There are no barriers or other obstacles avail-
able to stop the vehicle before it reaches the ship. Host
country authorities are not present. The captain of the
ship judges the vehicle to represent a life-endangering
threat to the ship, since by breaking through the barrier
checkpoint on the pier it has committed a hostile act.
The commanding officer, therefore, instructs the ship's
personnel to use the minimum force required to protect
themselves and the ship.
C. CHAIN OF COMMAND
Today's military chain of command is straight-forward but
can be complicated as naval units switch operational comman-
ders. For example, when units deploy overseas they "chop"
-from one -fleet commander to another when they cross theater
boundaries on deployment. The maintenance o-f many adminis-
trative ties with the "parent" command (the squadron ar
group commander in home port) while deployed is routine.
The situation o-f a terrorist incident should be viewed as an
operational concern. Including the "parent" command in
operational message tra-f-fic while deployed, however, is a
touchy subject and, as a rule, is not usually done. The
inclusion o-f "parent" commands in all message tra-f-fic re-
lated to a terrorist incident should, however, be viewed as
an exception to the "rule" of exclusion -from operational
tra-f-fic. The primary reason for this break from the rule is
that no command in the United States is going to be more
familiar with the physical status of a unit than the
"parent" command and no command is in a better position to
provide that time-critical information to decision makers in
Washington, D. C. than the "parent" command. Hence, the
"parent" command should be included in all terrorist related
message traffic involving a naval unit.
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D. REPORTING
In the event of a terrorist incident involving U. S.
military personnel or property overseas, three, channels o-f
communications are activated to deal with such an incident.
These three channels are the military, the diplomatic, and
the host nation systems. These channels are most probably
activated with the submission o-f an QPREP-3 PINNACLE message
(an operational report providing in-formation on an incident
o-f national interest) by the command. Provisions -for writ-
ing such messages are -found in the Joint Reporting Structure
[Refs. 42 and 433. Specific details for particular reports
should be investigated through the chain of command for the
area of operations. A working knowledge of how reports and
responses travel through the chain of command, both military
and diplomatic, is necessary in order to have an effective
contingency plan for a terrorist incident.
Overseas the unified commander, for example USCINCELJR
(United States Commander in Chief Europe), is tasked with
the "coordination of all local policies and measures to
protect DOD personnel abroad from terrorist attacks." The
unified commander will also "serve as the DOD point of
contact with U. S. Embassies and host country officials on
matters regarding such policies and measures." This system
is the military channel for dealing with terrorist
incidents. CRef. 8: p. Zl
6?
The diplomatic channel links the unified commander with
the State Department via the U. S. ambassador. In the
national crisis management process, the State Department is
assigned as the "lead agency" for overseas terrorist inci-
dents CRef. 38: p. 63. This remains the case unless a
military option is adopted in which case the DOD will take
the lead. When an incident is reported a task -Force is
convened in the operations center of the State Department
and remains activated twenty-four hours a day until the
situation is resolved.
Concurrently, a third system is activated. This is the
host nation system which links Washington and the host
nation government via the representative ambassador.
While all avenues are being pursued to resolve the
problem at hand, information flow to the local military
commander originates with the National Command Authority,
and is passed through the State Department, to the local
ambassador, to the unified commander, and ultimately to the
commanding officer.
E. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
One area of caution in the development of contingency
plans for handling terrorist incidents, addresses the news
media. As discussed earlier, the publicity associated with
terrorist incidents can be staggering and is often a size-
able part of the reason for the act. Onboard ship, the
public affairs officer (PAO) must be thoroughly familiar
with the theater guidelines on any release of information.
Since the position of PAO is usually a collateral duty
onboard ship, assistance from a larger command with a dedi-
cated PAO (one whose primary duty is public affairs) should
be solicited as quickly as possible as U. S. national inter-
ests and host nation sensitivities could be placed in a
precarious balance under the conditions of a terrorist inci-
dent. The events that followed the hijacking of the Achi.l.l.e
L^ki!19 cruise ship in October 19S5 serves as an example of a
terrorist incident that greatly strained U. S. relations
with other nations, in this case, Egypt and Italy.
F. INITIAL RESPONSE
In the event the preventive anti -terrorist measures
employed by a naval unit fail and a terrorist incident
occurs, the contingency plan should be activated. The suc-
cess of the initial response to a terrorist incident will be
measured by the quality of the contingency plan and will be
dependent on the amount of training devoted to that plan.
G. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Rules of Engagement (ROE) Are defined in The Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms as "directives issued by
competent authority which delineate the circumstances and
limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered." CRef. 44: p. 2983
In most peacetime scenarios where conflict- is possible,
the use o-f force is controlled. The use of force is nor-
mally limited to self-defense against a hostile threat in
response to a hostile act. The ROE will also specify which
command has authority to declare a force hostile. Because
there is such a short time available to respond to a ter-
rorist attack and because there are so many different inter-
pretations given to the ROE throughout the chain of command,
the subject of the ROE should be viewed with concern by
commanding officers.
Whether inport or at sea, if a rising tension situation
exists the environment must be closely monitored for
changes. If a threat cannot be avoided, for example by
getting underway, then improving self-defense must be initi-
ated. This means that small arms weapons are loaded, gun
ammunition is brought up to the loader drum, and/or missiles
are placed in assembly; the appropriate upgrade in readiness
is essential because when the terrorist strikes there i s no
time to load weapons, let alone request that a force be
declared hostile by higher authority. Armed forces must
react in self-defense with split-second timing to protect
the ship and its personnel.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The commanding o-f-ficers of the ships in todays U. S.
Navy are not provided with a guide for the development of
anti- and counter-terrorist programs. This paper represents
a tool that can be used in the preparation of such programs
and which is flexible for adaptation to all ship types.
Central to the success of both anti-terrorist and
counterterror i st efforts is a well informed sailor. The
education of the crew in the fundamentals of terrorism is
therefore emphasised as the initial step to handling ter-
rorism. The following quote stresses the importance of
understanding the terrorist as the foundation for dealing
with terrorists. "The first essential for living with ter-
rorism is to understand it; to understand how terrorists
work, and why; to understand the anatomy of their operations
and their weapons and techniques; to understand the techni-
cal and tactical methods available for the defense against
them." CRef. 32: p. 153
The fundamentals of terrorism are set forth in this
study in such a way that they may be extracted from the text
and presented to the crew in a series of lesson plans. Two
proposed schedules for educating the crew in the fundamen-
tals of terrorism are delineated in Appendix A. These
schedules suggest two approaches to training the crew:
•first, during normal working hours and, second, by duty
section.
After becoming -familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the
terrorist, the commanding officer is now armed with the
required information necessary for developing a security
plan tailored for his ship to deter the terrorist threat.
Suggestions for the improvement of security procedures, such
as relocating the forecastle and fantail watch to the 04
level on a destroyer, are given in the text. Also brought
out in this paper are insights into several vulnerable
situations encountered by a ship that Are conducive to
terrorist attacks, including, for example restricted maneu-
verability when entering port. The proposals set forth for
modifications to security procedures and the examination of
vulnerable situations should be useful but are not all-
inclusive. The modification of security systems that apply
to a destroyer in combatting terrorism do not necessarily
apply to an aircraft carrier . The intent is for each ship
to expand on the above ideas and develop improvements in
security that are best suited to the ship's particular type
and mission.
In addition to education and security adjustments, the
commanding officer must also consider what steps to follow
in the event of a terrorist attack. The commander's prepa-
ration of contingency plans is essential to upgrade the
readiness pasture of a ship as the terrorist threat level
increases. Pre-planned responses to rising tension sce-
narios must be delineated, for example, securing liberty and
making preparations -for getting underway in a high threat
level environment. The authority and responsibility o-f the
commanding o-fficer, United States policy towards terrorism,
the rules o-f engagement in effect, and reporting require-
ments in the event of attack are some of the considerations
addressed in the text that are intended to assist the com-
manding officer in developing contingency plans.
Terrorist incidents have become a significant part of
the contemporary threat environment for U. S. armed forces
overseas and the possibility of a terrorist act against a
U. S. naval vessel seems far more likely today than in the
past. It has been a long-standing tradition in the U. S.
Surface Navy that the commanding officers of naval ships
train their officers and crew to anticipate adverse situa-
tions, to expect the unexpected. Firefighting teams are^
for example, exercised daily and the self defense force is
exercised periodically so that if an adverse and unexpected
situation arises they will be fully prepared to deal with
it. In today's Navy, however, they must also think the
unthinkable. A whole new set of questions must be added to
the mental checklist of a watchstander in order for him to
anticipate a bizarre terrorist incident and react in a
timely and decisive manner.
APPENDIX A
PROPOSED ANTI ZTERRQRISI TRAINING PLAN
In order to develop any kind of effective anti -terrori st
and counterterrorist programs for U. S. Navy ships, the
fundamentals of terrorism must be learned by all members of
ships' company. There are a variety of ways in which the
information can be presented.
The U. S. Navy could develop a presentation on video
cassette that could be distributed to the fleet and pre-
sented over each ship's closed circuit television (CCTV)
system. A less expensive, but similar, approach might be to
distribute the video cassette presentation to all destroyer
squadron commanders, group commanders, and forward deployed
units for loaning to ships as required.
If a formal Navy presentation on video cassette is not
available, the CCTV system on each ship could be used to
pre-record lesson plans for later presentation or to present
lesson plans live.
Whether a CCTV system is installed on a ship or not, the
command may prefer to present the material in person. In
either case, using the CCTV or live presentations, there are
several approaches that could be used to accomplish the
anti- and counterterrorist training program.
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The diversity in size o-f the ships and crews within the
U. S. Navy dictates that several different approaches to
anti-terrorist training are required. The number o-f duty
sections and the different sizes of divisions and depart-
ments on a naval unit vary widely -from a small -frigate to an
aircra-ft carrier . Consequently, there are many different
schemes that could be used in the development of an anti-
terrorist training program on board a ship. Each commanding
officer must decide which training scheme is best suited to
his ship's characteristics. This appendix discusses two of
the many possible anti -terrori st training schemes: first,
training the entire crew during normal working hours and,
second, training by duty section.
Prior to commencing any type of training regimen, one or
two assigned officers must review the training material and
then prepare a one week course of instruction to the ward-
room and chief petty officers' mess. The basic information
can be delivered in five twenty to forty minute sessions.
The short period of time allotted to each training session
is designed to maintain the attention span of those at-
tending and to allow time for questions and discussion.
The decision must then be made on who will present the
material and how he will make that presentation. One way, as
mentioned, is to present the material during normal training
hours by division or department. Each division officer or
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leading chief petty o-f-ficer is recommended to present the
material to his respective division.
A second way of implementing the training is to teach
the crew by duty section. In this method, the command duty
officer, duty weapons department o-f-ficer, or leading chie-f
in the duty section may be selected to present the material.
Another possible candidate who may be selected for pre-
senting the material to a duty section is the individual
designated -for security training o-f that duty section. The
actual training o-f each duty section might be conducted just
prior to eight o'clock reports and be-fore movie call. No
matter what anti -terrorist training scheme is chosen, the
•five lesson -fundamental indoctrination is scheduled at one
lesson per week so as not to unduly tax the regular training
schedule.
While the training o-f the crew in anti -terrorist and
counterterrorist techniques is in progress, an analysis o-f
current security measures by the executive o-f-ficer, senior
watch officer, security manager, and other designated per-
sonnel must be conducted. This analysis should involve the
examination o-f current security procedures in the interest
o-f introducing modifications that will deter terrorist at-
tacks. This review should not be limited only to the areas
exemplified in Chapter IV but should stimulate the investi-




A-fter the education of the crew and the concurrent
review o-f security procedures, suggested changes should be
closely examined, experimented with, refined, implemented,
and, if proven successful, incorporated into both instruc-
tions and security training. One must remember that inport
watches, such as the quarterdeck watch and the fore-
castl e/f antai 1 watch, Are not the only areas of concern.
Yeomen and postal clerks must have separate training in
mail -bomb recognition. The master-at-arms force must have
training in bomb recognition for inspecting stares. If the
command elects to make changes to the sea and anchor detail
manning for entering port, then the appropriate bill must be
changed and training conducted. Other areas requiring new
training may surface as a result of the command's review of
the ship's anti -terrori st posture. Consequently, the pro-
posed training programs may very well take longer than the
suggested ten weeks. Avoiding over-reactive crisis manage-
ment, exercising a command's flexibility, and respecting the
commanding officer's prerogative Are built into the proposed
training schemes. The training schedules outlined in this
appendix merely serve as examples that may help each indivi-
dual ship get started on its own training system.
The anti- and counterterrorist education program should
also be incorporated into the indoctrination of new crew
members. Watches should be exercised periodically in coun-
terterrorist procedures as part of the daily drill
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program. Reviews should be scheduled annually for the crew
and within at least three months prior to deployment.
Following is the suggested order -for the -five lesson
training program in anti- and counterterrorism and the page
numbers -for locating the material within this thesis.
Lesson 1: Introduction to and Definition o-f
Terrorism . . . (pp. 6-21).
Lesson 2: A Terrorist's Pro-file and How Terrorists a.re
Motivated . . . (pp. 21-24, 33-37).
Lesson 3: Terrorist Techniques and Ships'
Vulnerabilities . . . (pp. 24-33, 58-63).
Lesson 4s Individual Protection and Hostage Survival
. . . (pp. 82-86)
.
Lesson 5: Review.
Table 5 is a suggested schedule for training a destroyer
type ship by department during normal working hours. Table
6 is a suggested schedule -for training a destroyer type ship
in five duty sections. No lessons are scheduled on Saturday
or Sunday for either training proposal. The total training
plan which includes the indoctrination of the officers and
crew, the review and modification of security provisions,
TABLE PROPOSED TRAINING SCHEDULE






Wardroom/CPO ' s introduction to program




and the implementation o-f the security directives is
designed to last ten weeks.







Wardroom/CPO ' s introduction to program
Duty section training and concurrent
security review
Security team training









(Wardroom and CPO training
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(Duty section security team training)
(Duty section security team training)
Explanation: Training would be conducted each day of
the week listed vertically for Duty Section 1. No
training would be conducted for Duty Section 1 in the




The elements o-f personal protection should be incorpo-
rated into the educational presentations on the -fundamentals
o-f terrorism. After each person has a grasp o-f how terror-
ists operate, think, and plan, he can apply the knowledge to
a personal protection plan, particularly when ashore. Before
addressing the principles of personal protection, two psy-
chological factors must be aired to make the reader aware of
the influence American culture has on how he may perceive
the effects of a violent situation. Douglas Derrer has
cited these two factors as denial and organizational
dependency CRef. 18: p. 195].
A. DENIAL
Two expressions of denial are common: "It'll never
happen to me" and "I'm not important enough." Regarding the
first, remember that no one is immune to terrorist acts.
Avoiding the issue makes one more vulnerable. This applies
to both the individual and the command. The effects of such
an attitude not only endanger anti -terrori st efforts but
also avoids the crucial issue of contingency planning.
The second misconception, "I'm not important enough," is
a serious fallacy. Terrorist do not limit their attacks to
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high ranking people. Enlisted personnel have been the vic-
tims o-f terrorist attacks in Puerto Rico, Turkey, Greece,
and Germany. Overcoming denial and learning everything one
can to avoid terrorists is an important step to survival.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL DEPENDENCY
The protective umbrella o-f the ship cannot provide secur-
ity -for the individual when faced with a terrorist incident
while on liberty. I-f con-fronted with a terrorist incident
while ashore on liberty, the individual must rely on his own
knowledge and resources to counter the threat.
0. THE PRINCIPLES OP PERSONAL PROTECTION
The strategy of personal protection is avoidance. The
principles of this strategy are: be alert, be unpredict-
able, and keep a low profile. These principles are built on
the understanding and knowledge of terrorist methods. The
following list provides many suggestions for the application
of these three principles of protection CRef. IS: pp. 195-
198; Ref. 45: p. 3-13.
1. When going on liberty, avoid going alone. Travel in
small groups—there is safety in numbers.
2. Attempt to blend into your surroundings. Don't be
conspicuous. Do not wear uniforms on liberty. Leave
clothing that is clearly American at home, for
example, cowboy hats, cowboy belt buckles, and boots.
3. Avoid routine and be unpredictable. Use different
routes and times of movement. Travel on busy, well
lit, well-traveled streets. Avoid dangerous areas
placed off limits to the crew.
S3
4. Avoid showing off material wealth. Remember to blend
with the local people.
5. The command should provide the crew with cards listing
emergency telephone numbers: the quarterdeck,
military police, fire department, hospital, and local
pol ice.
6. Avoid civil disturbances and disputes with local
citizens.
7. Be sensitive to the possibility of surveillance. Do
not hesitate to report suspicious activities to the
chain of command or to authorities.
Again, all of the suggestions listed above can be summa-
rized in three short phrases and applied to most situations:




As mentioned in the discussion of personal protection,
knowing what can happen in a hostage situation and how to
best survive such an experience is something all military
personnel should be exposed to. Likewise, as with personal
protection, the psychological -Factor o-f denial must be over-
come. Most people simply ignore the potential problem. All
personnel must -face the problem and plan accordingly.
Specific guidance for all situations is impossible. The
following list of some specific "do's and don'ts" to be
complied with in a hostage situation were consolidated from
several sources and will be of assistance in most situation
CRef. 11: p. 112; Ref . 37: p. 1-13.
1. Do be correct and polite to the terrorists.
2. Do build human relationships. Identify those captors
with whom you can communicate and attempt to estab-
lish a relationship with one or more of them. Do not
debate or argue but try to discuss neutral issues.
3. Do talk in a normal voice. Avoid whispering when
talking to other hostages, or raising your voice when
talking to a terrorist.
4. Control yourself, your time, and your environment.
Maintain personal hygiene and exercise regularly, if
you can. Try to establish a daily routine and keep
your mind occupied. Part of your daily routine
should be housekeeping.
5. Do remember that negotiations and rescue plans are in
progress for your benefit.
SI
6. Do obey terrorist orders or commands.
7. Do be alert -for signs or signals from outside rescue
attempts.
8. Do be a role model. If the victim is calm, the
terrorists will also be calm.
9. Do ask for permission to communicate with the local
U. S. Embassy or other U. S. government representa-
tives, your commander, or family, preferably
in the order stated.
10. Do not attempt escape unless the opportunity present-;
itself during the initial abduction stage. Thereaf-
ter, escape should only be attempted as a last re-
sort .
11. Do not anticipate early release. Many terrorist
abductions last for months. Prepare yourself men-
tally for an extended captivity.
12. Do not complain, act belligerently, or be uncoopera-
tive when dealing with the terrorists or other
hostages.
13. Do not deliberately turn your back to a terrorist.
14. Do not refuse any favors offered by the terrorists.
15. Do not worry about your family.
16. Do not hesitate to answer questions about yourself.
Military members ^re authorized and encouraged to
give name, rank, service number, date of birth, and
those circumstances leading to their detention.
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